I
On July 9, 1908, it was announced in the Münchener Neuesten Nachrichten that at the University Teachers' Congress in Jena a few months hence, a resolution would be proposed on the subject of academic freedom. The newspaper's cultural supplement published a document that was five pages long in support of the resolution, along with a notice addressed to university teachers throughout the country. It asserted that in both Germany and Austria, ultramontane Catholics had organized themselves into parties whose aim it was to impose limitations on academic freedom. At the Department of Theology in Innsbruck, they had recently managed to have an instructor removed from his position after having publicly accused him of failing to respect the Christian faith. Shortly thereafter, a professor at the University of Munich had met a similar fate. The examples made it evident that the need for countermeasures was urgent. If nothing was done, it was feared that the trend would soon become unstoppable:
As soon as a couple of precedents have been set, the process will be in full swing. If church law teachers and dogma historians are not allowed to present the results of their painstaking and conscientious research, because there is a religious political party that is against it, then why should astronomers, anthropologists, zoologists, pathologists and psychiatrists be allowed to do so? They could, just as many others, generate research results that are unacceptable to a religious political party. The rights that are currently extended to the religious political party will soon be extended to political, social and economic interest groups (Amira 1908: 74) .
The goal of the congress was therefore obvious. The university teachers would, through the proposed resolution, voice the liberal principles that they had a joint interest in defending. The call also went out to Germanspeaking academics in Switzerland and Austria (BdMNN 1908a) .
The threats described in the account were not new. Less than 40 years earlier, the catholic Center Party had been formed in Germany. Otto von Bismarck, the 'iron chancellor', feared that the party was receiving support from the Vatican and that it harbored plans to mobilize its members against the government. Catholics were labelled enemies of the state and the primary opponents in the Kulturkampf, which came to dominate German domestic politics in the 1870s. Professors and the universityeducated generally sided with the government. There were several reasons for this, including the fact that the first Vatican Council had recently adopted the dogma of papal infallibility. The doctrine bestowed an almost limitless authority upon the Roman bishopric over issues of faith and morality and was therefore considered to be incompatible with academic freedom. In November 1877, the physiologist Rudolf Virchow spoke before the Prussian chamber of deputies. Addressing the Catholics in attendance he suggested: 'If it were possible, you would place the Pope at the top and let him rule over the entire world ' (StBAH 1877-78: 567) . Judging from the public sentiments voiced prior to the congress in Jena, the misgivings remained the same.
Nevertheless, it soon became apparent that the opinions differed regarding the origins of the threat to academic freedom. Already the week before the congress, the liberal paper Frankfurter Zeitung published an article in which one of the attendees openly opposed the current resolution proposal. The author in question had already gained a reputation as very outspoken in the political debates pertaining to the university.
Only one month previously he had attacked the academic establishment in Berlin through the same newspaper, portraying several of its members as politically appointed opportunists (Weber 1908a) . Once again, professor Max Weber from Heidelberg was disseminating ideas for which he would soon be fielding criticism from outraged colleagues.
Weber did not deny the existence of the threat that the congress committee had pointed out. He emphasized, however, that there were significantly more urgent challenges to fend off than der Klerikalismus, if one were truly serious about ensuring academic freedom. In order to clarify where the problem lay, he began by citing one example: A wellregarded private lecturer by the name of Robert Michels had recently decided to apply for a regular teaching position. Since he was a Social Democrat it was not possible, for legal reasons, for him to be appointed in Prussia. Instead, he made the decision to settle in Jena. Well aware that his political involvement could be used against him there as well, he had decided in advance to attempt to extract a promise of fair treatment. The subject representative requested had, however, announced in a letter that he, in this case, found it impossible to approve a promotion. He did not provide any reasons. Shortly thereafter, according to Weber, this already remarkable story resulted in a tragicomic outcome. During this time, Michels had emigrated to Italy and was now on a return visit in his homeland. At the University in Marburg, he contacted a former colleague in hopes of being able to find out why his application had been rejected in Jena. His colleague apparently misunderstood what the errand involved and got the idea that Michels had plans to run as a candidate for professor in his own faculty. It was therefore not long afterwards that Michels received another letter explaining that he was unsuitable to serve as professor. This time the sender openly admitted their misgivings-not only was Michels an active Social Democrat, it had also come to light that he had not baptized his children.
According to Weber, this case was not unique. Personally, he said that he was convinced that many of his colleagues believed that Michels had been treated exactly as he, a socialist, deserved. What had recently occurred in Jena and Marburg could therefore just as likely have occurred elsewhere. The fact that one continued to pretend that there was academic freedom worthy of defending was perceived by Weber as almost fraudulent:
In any case, it should be required in the interest of good taste and truthfulness that henceforward we ought not to speak of the existence of the 'freedom of science and teaching' in Germany, as has always been done. The fact is that the alleged academic freedom is obviously bound up with the espousal of certain views which are politically acceptable in court circles and in salons, and furthermore with the manifestation of a certain minimum of conformity with ecclesiastical opinion or, at least, with a facsimile thereof. The 'freedom of science' exists in Germany within the limits of political and ecclesiastical acceptability. Outside these limits, there is none.
Furthermore, Weber claimed that this political rectification was intimately linked to the 'dynastic character' of the German state (Weber 1908b) . Between the lines, it became apparent that he regarded identification by the scientific community with the government as a much more serious threat to academic freedom than Catholicism.
It must be said at the outset that Weber was unsuccessful in his intent to mobilize the members gathered in Jena against the discrimination to which he believed that Robert Michels and his party friends had been subjected. He received even less support in the debate that followed in the German daily press. Several writers claimed that it was essential to ban people with politically radical views from the university. At the risk of getting ahead of events, there is cause here to adopt certain cautionary measures in terms of viewing sources critically. It is no doubt a fact that Social Democrats were discriminated against by German seats of learning at that time; just as it was also common practice to weed out Jews and Catholics when they were applying for vacant professorships. However, it does not automatically follow that academic freedom was, in practice, set aside. Modern historians have often assumed that such was the case. 'In practice', writes for example Konrad H. Jarausch, 'academic freedom often failed to live up to its lofty theory' (Jarausch 1982: 170) . It is important to point out that this conclusion can neither be verified nor falsified without going back and investigating what one actually meant by academic freedom at the time. This immediately poses a problem. A closer examination shows that during this period, there was no commonly accepted definition of this concept. On the contrary, one is forced to conclude that die Freiheit von Forschung und Lehre could be ascribed a number of different meanings-depending on the ideological interests that were thought to be important to maintain. In fact, even those who defended the discrimination that occurred within the university, often did so in the name of academic freedom. The debate that I will recount next can be described as a conflict over who would have the right to define that, much debated, concept.
II
That said, it should be noted that the following study is not motivated solely or even primarily by an interest in conceptual history. An overrid-ing ambition is to highlight some of the problems that I believe caused Weber to develop the concept of value-free science. I will not discuss either the theoretical prerequisites for, or the methodological implications of, that position. Rather, the purpose is to understand why Weber felt that a value-free science was desirable. What interests was the doctrine of a value-free science meant to serve? To what end was it intended to be used?
One could argue that Weber himself has authorized us to formulate the questions in this manner. In order for the advocacy of a value-free science to be meaningful, one must be able to demonstrate that it is actually possible to justify the distinction between facts and values. Even if that is the case, it does not necessarily mean that it is desirable to uphold such a distinction. Weber frequently points out that this conclusion does not follow from his premises. The assertion that a value-free science is desirable is itself a value judgement and cannot, by definition, be objectively verified. In other words, it is impossible to prove the validity of the rules that Weber wants to impose on academic activities; individuals have to judge for themselves, based on their own values, whether or not those rules are motivated. Consequently, the question is what values did Weber himself follow in his quest for a value-free science?
An important clue is found at the beginning of 'Der Sinn der "Wertfreiheit" der soziologischen und ökonomischen Wissenschaften' from 1917. In a seldom-noticed passage, Weber maintains that he recommends a value-free science primarily for reasons of university politics: the question whether one should in general assert practical evaluations in teaching…is one of practical university politics. On that account, in the last analysis, it must be decided only with reference to those tasks which the individual, according to his own set of values, assigns to the universities (Weber 1988: 491) .
Weber subsequently points out that the problems causing him to argue in favor of a value-free science did not exist in the same sense 40 years earlier. Without attempting to determine exactly what is meant by this time reference, one can assume that very specific political problems motivated his position. I will argue next that the doctrine of a value-free science should be understood at least partially against the backdrop of the debate regarding academic freedom at the turn of the last century.
It should be noted that Weber, at the outset of the twentieth century, was very active in debates regarding university politics. In a number of articles and lectures, he discussed the unsatisfactory state of affairs he observed within the universities. Given the interest devoted to his other writings, it is somewhat surprising that these texts have not yet been the subject of a thorough investigation. Edward Shils translated selections of them into English in the 1970s (Shils 1973) . In German, the texts are only available in their original form. Dirk Käsler devotes two pages to them in Einführung in das Studium Max Webers from 1979, mentioning at the same time that no previous research has been conducted in that area (Käsler 1979: 217-18) . A more recent essay is Wilhelm Hennis' 'Die volle Nüchernheit des Urteils' from 1994. Hennis contends that Weber is advocating a distinction between facts and values primarily for didactic reasons. He finds support for this interpretation in the texts that I discuss in this paper (Hennis 1994: 132-44 ). Hennis' analysis contains several interesting observations, but is also saddled with certain problems. In order to do justice to Weber's arguments on university politics one must, in my view, consider the opinions that Weber intended to refute with those arguments. Hennis studies Weber's texts in isolation from that context. As a result, he disregards the fact that the doctrine for a valuefree science was, for Weber, intimately tied to a very specific definition of the concept of academic freedom.
III
How then did the participants gathered in Jena define academic freedom? The chairman of the congress, Professor Karl von Amira, belonged to those who advocated a very restrictive usage of the concept. In his opening presentation, he encouraged the other participants to pass over, with their silence, any meddling in the right to habilitate oneself for academic service. So that there would not be any doubt as to which questions would be dealt with, he made the following proposal:
For me, the question is not to what extent research and teaching freedom should be regulated prior to someone assuming an academic position, or for those who are perhaps not even active as teachers… I believe that we must be content to deal with the question that I have spelled out in advance, namely: To what extent can and should a university teacher, who is already active in the profession, regardless of whether he is an permanent professor or a private lecturer, have limitations imposed on how he executes his work (BdMNN 1908b: 629) .
In other words, academic freedom should only be reserved for those who already taught at the universities. In passing, Amira acknowledged that he himself favored this usage of the concept primarily for pragmatic reasons. It is clear that, with a broader definition of academic freedom, he would have forced the congress to take into consideration the fact that certain people, because of their political views, were weeded out in advance when applying for teaching positions. The prospect of passing the announced resolution would likely have been much poorer under such circumstances. Regardless of whether they would have taken a position for or against discrimination caused by faculty, there would undoubtedly have been members who would have protested. It is likely that Amira hoped that the prescribed definition of academic freedom would make it possible to circumvent the problem. For the moment, it was more important to be vigilant about the rights that were designated for individuals who had already retained their venia legendi.
It should be noted that Amira had already made public the resolution proposal on which congress members would have to take a position. A preliminary version had been published in Münchener Neuesten Nachrichten together with the notice mentioned above. The resolution consisted of nine articles. Towards the end of his presentation, Amira reviewed them one at a time and also explained why he felt they were necessary. The two introductory articles deserve special attention. Both had, as we shall soon see, a fair amount of impact on the debate that followed the conclusion of the congress in the German daily press. The first article prescribed that academic activities could not be conducted other than through directives indicated by the scientific method:
Scientific research and results must, by necessity, be independent of all other considerations except those that derive from the scientific method as such, in other words: above all, independent of those prejudices and traditions that are espoused by the masses, independent of authorities and social groups, independent of outside interests (Amira 1908: 74-75 ).
In his commentary, Amira defended this article with the argument that it would be dishonorable of an instructor to express convictions to his students for which he did not have support (BdMNN 1908b: 630) .
The second article was designed as an appendix to the previous one. Indirectly, it encouraged the state to acknowledge those requirements for unimpeded academic autonomy that the congress favoured: 'The previous article (1) is, just like science itself, in the interest of the state since the dissemination and growth of knowledge were never detrimental, but only advantageous to society' (Amira 1908: 75) . Obviously, Amira realized that this formulation would generate criticism in certain circles. In his commentary, he admitted that such a policy, taken to the extreme, implied that the state must refrain from its right to impose punishment on teachers who use their podiums to promote ideas that are dangerous to society. He himself believed that this was an entirely reasonable requirement. He concluded, 'So-called anti-government teachings have always had a place at universities in the civilized world' (BdMNN 1908b: 631) . As an example, he mentioned how, in the past, universities taught that the murder of tyrants was politically justified and that there were currently Catholic theologians who contested the legitimacy of civil marriages. It was important for him to point out, however, that this had never prevented the state from recruiting people from centers of learning to work in the public bureaucracy. 'That demonstrates', he concluded, 'that the state bides its time and can afford to wait until the anti-government teachings have been falsified by the free science' (BdMNN 1908b: 631) . In practice, the proposed principle would mean that a teacher employed at a university would enjoy the right to retain his position even if it was discovered that he had adopted entirely different positions in his teaching than those preferred by the government. Since teachings that were hostile to the state were bound to be refuted by the 'free science', the state could save itself the effort of repressing them.
From the twenty speakers who took part in the subsequent discussion, only two had reservations against the proposed resolutions purely on grounds of principle. Weber had previously announced that it would be impossible for him to approve a resolution that did not take a stand against the restrictions that prevented his Social Democratic countrymen from qualifying themselves for academic service. Once again he took the opportunity to spell out his objections. Like his brother, Alfred Weber, who was active in Prague, he felt that one additional article should be added to Amira's resolution. Not until possible cases of discrimination were put on an equal footing to other violations of academic freedom could he accept the proposed resolution. Alfred Weber espoused the following wording: 'In order for it to be possible to conduct independent research and teaching at universities, then researchers and instructors must never be dismissed or prevented from assuming an academic position due to their political convictions or world view' (BdMNN 1908b: 633) . Weber himself put it much less diplomatically: 'The political convictions of a teacher are entirely irrelevant to his appointment. We do not want to have investigations into peoples' viewpoints, not from any side. Those who engage in such activities are wretches' (BdMNN 1908b: 635) . Once again, Weber emphasized that it was unreasonable to reserve academic freedom only for those men who had already received their venia legendi. It was just as important that the politically radical individuals who, as a rule, were denied these attractive benefits, received the right to compete for vacant positions on the same terms as other candidates. Finally, the congress decided to table the issue and, if possible, take it up at a later date. Weber then left the room seething with anger, and declaring: 'I don't care about academic freedom for those who already have obtained positions as university instructors, provided that certain individuals are weeded out even before they have had a chance to get in ' (HN; Vorwärts: 1908) .
IV
In the days that followed, almost all of the German daily papers reported on the congress in Jena. Most observers felt that Weber had demonstrated a remarkable lack of political judgement. On 30 September, the Hamburger Nachrichten reported that the other participants had decided to wait until the next year's congress before taking a final position on whether Social Democrats should be given the right to hold academic offices. The author made no secret of the fact that he felt it would have been better if they had immediately denied Weber's demand. Like many other writers, he emphasized that universities had the obligation to fulfil the state's needs for well-educated public officials. The discrimination that Robert Michels and his comrades had to endure, appeared less as a threat, in this context, to academic freedom than as a way to defend the current political order against its enemies. 'It would be absolute insanity for the state to arm its enemies and allow university employed instructors to inoculate future public officials with their revolutionary poison', according to the author (HN 1908) .
Some of Weber's opponents also attempted to justify the discrimination that occurred at universities on the basis of scientific grounds. Those who adopted this position generally defined academic research as an activity unbound by prerequisites other than those imposed by scientific method. The real reason why Social Democrats were not allowed to teach, according to one writer in Tägliche Rundschau, was that their view of society was not scientifically reliable: 'Of course it is not about prying into peoples' beliefs, as Max Weber suggested. The question is whether it is possible to ascribe an adult man the mental maturity that the teaching profession requires if he, despite the latest advances in economics, still considers himself a Marxist.' The fact that the congress did not take a clearer stand against the requirements that Weber had attempted to impose, the author reasoned, could only stem from the participants' desire to not appear divided to outsiders. He could not imagine that the they would seriously consider supporting a proposal that he regarded as incompatible with the principles that they themselves had established: 'The Marxist is not free from all loyalties as Amira's resolution dictates. He is not free from the prejudices of the masses; rather he stirs up these prejudices; nor is he independent of interests and authorities' (TR 1908) .
Writers who explicitly defended the recruitment policies of the universities went much further than the congress participants at Jena did. The latter, of course, did not take sides either for or against the political restrictions in place. Nonetheless, the question arises as to whether, through the resolutions and principles they adopted, they didn't indi-rectly motivate the discrimination against Social Democrats. As we have seen, the congress had declared that a teacher employed at the university should have the right to retain his office, even if it were later revealed that he, through his teaching, was promoting policies hostile to the state. According to chairman Karl von Amira, a professor should, in principle, be entitled to teach whatever political ideas he thought fit. As such, this principle was of course a very liberal one. It is important to emphasize, however, that it in no way seems to have benefited the political radicals who were usually denied the right to teach at universities. Many people involved in the debate obviously felt that the freedom of speech granted to university teachers, made it even more imperative to take measures against candidates suspected of using the podium in order to spread anti-government propaganda. In this sense, the discrimination that occurred at the nation's teaching facilities was viewed less as a limitation of academic freedom than as a politically necessary prerequisite for it. As long as one did not wish to see any restrictions as to what could be taught at the universities, it became that much more important that there be rules for who was allowed to teach there. This conclusion is confirmed by an exchange printed in November 1908 in the professional journal Hochschul-Nachrichten. During the previous months, it had been suggested that Weber was not entirely reliable when he claimed that the philosophical faculty at Jena, for purely political reasons, had denied Robert Michels' right to apply as a candidate for a regular teaching position. Paul von Salvisberg, editor for HochschulNachrichten, had himself, in a previous issue, stated that it had not yet been possible to prove any suspicions of discrimination in this case. Shortly afterwards Weber had a chance to reply. In order to eliminate any doubt, he explained that a spokesman for the current faculty had actually admitted that they did not accept candidates there with radical viewpoints. Salvisberg now felt compelled to comment on the matter once again. If, in fact, it was true that Michels had been the victim of discrimination, he argued, one could not however draw the conclusion that academic freedom had been set aside. It all depended on how one defined the concept: 'The Michels' case at most demonstrates that the Jena faculty did not believe that academic freedom entitles just anybody to teach, but that once someone has been found suitable to fill a state teaching position, they shall have the right to teach what they want'. Personally, Salvisberg felt that this usage of the concept was especially well motivated. He laconically pointed out that Professor Weber would probably himself not wish to hire a servant whose aim it was to slit his throat (H-N 1908: 45) .
V
In November 1908, Weber published a series of articles in the liberal publication Saale-Zeitung under the title 'Die Lehrfreiheit der Universitäten' (Weber 1908c) . During the preceding months, he had regularly been subjected to criticism, both in the daily press and in the trade press. Nevertheless, he once again now took the opportunity to condemn the discrimination that occurred at the universities. Remarkably, the text was reprinted in Hochschul-Nachrichten the following January (Weber 1908d: 89-91) . In a publication where Paul von Salvisberg had previously accused him of what could be best described as lese-majesty, Weber now got a chance to spell out his arguments to a broader academic audience.
To begin with, Weber harked back to the discussion that had taken place in Jena a few months earlier. Readers who had not been exposed to the reports on the congress that had been subsequently published, were now provided with a critical résumé. In passing, Weber mentioned that the participants had decided that teachers employed at the university should be given the right to keep their positions even if it was revealed that they were devout radicals. He felt this was an obvious principle. He suggested, however, that the problem was that they had deliberately avoided taking a stand against the exclusion of politically radical persons. It was evident that he, for this reason, felt that the definition of academic freedom proposed by the congress was unsatisfactory. Moreover, he took up another problem that had been neglected by the congress. According to a widely held belief, he explained, professors should refrain from publicly criticizing the political leadership. There were certain rules as to how public officials were to behave, even outside of their jobs. If one were to consider all of this together, according to Weber, one would be forced to define academic freedom in the following manner:
(1) when an appointment is at issue, not only the scientific or scholarly qualifications of the candidate for an academic post may and should be examined, but also his submissiveness to the prevailing political authorities and ecclesiastical usages; (2) a public protest against the prevailing political system may justify the removal of the incumbent of a professorial chair from his post; and (3) in the lecture hall, where neither publicity nor criticism are allowed, the persons who have been appointed as university teachers may express themselves as they wish 'independently of all authority' (Weber 1908d: 90) .
The fact that a professor be entitled to teach whatever he believed, unabhängig von allen Autoritäten, referred back to one of the principles that had been sanctioned at the congress in Jena. The result was that a teacher would not have to risk being dismissed, even if he voiced anti-government opinions from his podium. Weber let it be known that this generosity was most insidious. In his opinion, those who could currently benefit from such a policy were primarily those with a comfortable existence, the beati possidentes, who neither valued academic freedom as such, nor civil rights and duties in general. Furthermore, he pointed out that the concept of freedom that some of his colleagues held in high regard, could also be used as a cover for a comprehensive ideological standardization (Weber 1908d: 90) .
It is an ingeniously constructed set of rules that Weber exposes. People who are recruited to the universities are allowed to keep their positions even if it is later discovered that they are teaching something entirely contrary to the desires of the government. Consequently, teachers do not need to take into consideration any requirements of political conformity while at the podium. They can allow themselves to express the most radical of ideas to their students. This benefit is usually reserved, however, only for those who generally refrain from certain civil rights. The freedom of speech that university teachers enjoy at the podium is stripped away as soon as they enter the public realm. The whole arrangement is reminiscent of a skillfully set trap. Some 70 years earlier, Heinrich Heine wrote in a now classic study: 'As soon as one seems to have discovered that the university is governed by rebellion, that is to say a passion for freedom, then it is insinuated from all directions that sovereigns must suppress these institutions, or at least convert them into ordinary educational institutions' (Heine 1835; 1997: 39) . The situation that Weber describes looks somewhat different. Instead of suppressing the passion for freedom that exists at universities, the sovereign is now able to harness that to his own advantage. He only offers academic freedom to those who seem to desire it so much that they, in exchange, thereby forego the right to publicly criticize the established political system. For socialists and other radicals, in any event, the academic world is almost impenetrable territory. The opportunity to teach unabhängig von allen Autoritäten is therefore exclusively reserved for those comfortable opportunists who choose solidarity with the government. In the long term, predicts Weber, this will result in a faculty-wide standardization of political views. Paraphrasing Emil DuBois-Reymond, one could say that he is describing homo academicus trained to serve as a submissive soldier in the emperor's intellectual lifeguard.
Many of those who defended discrimination against the socialist candidates justified their position in terms of the universities being state institutions. It would be sheer madness to entrust revolutionary critics of the regime with the task of educating young people who would later be able to compete for public offices, they argued. Further on, Weber took the opportunity to rob this perception of its self-evidence. In other countries, he emphasizes, there are practically no hindrances against radical individuals who wish to have an academic career. 'In foreign universities, there are full professors who are, for example, socialists and, what is more, socialists of the most radical sort; some of them are among the most distinguished scientists and scholars that the countries in question can boast' (Weber 1908d: 90) . Why then were people with radical views denied the right to teach at German universities? The notion that socialists would use the opportunity to infiltrate the state bureaucracy through the universities, Weber implies, is simply a pretext. He points out that academic exams do not, of themselves, entitle anyone to hold public office. Somewhat abruptly he then states: 'Let us leave this formal mode of argument aside and deal with the question in the way it should be dealt with, namely, as a cultural problem' (Weber 1908d: 90) .
The fact that the university system is the concern of the state must, according to Weber, be viewed as a result of a specific German cultural development. Germany was for a long period of time a very poor nation and it had therefore never developed any well-financed, independent foundations, such as those founded in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Once the church's formerly dominant influence over the universities disappeared, there was no other choice for the members of the academic community other than to receive their funding from the state. Weber acknowledges that, from a material standpoint, that arrangement has subsequently proven to be incredibly advantageous for the German seats of learning. The only question now is what sort of conclusion one should draw from that. Should one adopt the view that the state has a right to be compensated for the resources that the universities have been awarded and, in exchange, demand that the universities graduate loyal subjects? Weber definitively refutes that opinion:
If the 'state', i.e., the seat of political power which dominates the national society, takes the view expressed in: 'I sing the tune of him whose bread I eat', if, in other words, the state conceives of the influence which it enjoys-in consequence of the economic situation of the universities-as a means of attaining a certain political obedience among university students, instead of looking upon it as an assumption of cultural responsibility, then the interests of science and scholarship in such a 'state' are no better and indeed, in many respects, are worse served than they were in the earlier condition of dependence on the church (Weber 1908d: 90) .
It should be clear that Weber does not merely bring up a hypothetical argument. One of the reasons most often cited for not allowing socialists to teach was that the universities had a duty to provide the state with loyal government officials. Apparently, Weber feared that this belief would also result in the political indoctrination of the students.
After this digression, Weber moves on to investigate more closely the premises behind the argument that certain people must be refused the right to teach. On what basis could one argue that the state should not allow the universities to spread propaganda dangerous to society? It was especially serious in Weber's eyes that, within academic circles, there were many who held precisely that view. They thereby betray that they have not understood the very nature of the academic profession. In a passage that clearly anticipates the theoretical scientific agenda that he would later develop in 'Der Sinn der "Wertfreiheit" ' and 'Wissenschaft als Beruf' he states:
Universities do not have as their task to teach any outlook or standpoint which is either 'hostile to the state' or 'friendly to the state'. They are not institutions for the inculcation of absolute or ultimate moral values. They analyse facts, their conditions, laws and interrelations; they analyse concepts, their logical presuppositions and content. They do not and they cannot teach what should happen-since this is a matter of ultimate personal values and beliefs, of a fundamental outlook, which cannot be 'demonstrated' like a scientific proposition… It would be just as presumptuous for a university teacher to undertake, for example, to 'demonstrate' the 'justification' of certain social demands, as it would be for him to 'show', by means of scientific or scholarly research, their 'lack of justification'. Both of these are simply impossible with the means made available by science or scholarship (Weber 1908d: 90) .
The point that Weber wants to convey is clear. The argument that the state must deny its enemies the right to spread propaganda dangerous to society from the podium, is based on a fundamentally flawed understanding of what academic pursuits are all about. Scientists and scholars are only charged with studying empirical and logical connections; to clarify under what circumstances various phenomena occur and to illuminate the meaning and significance of certain concepts. Consequently, awarding someone a professorial chair is therefore not at all the same as giving them the authority to influence political opinions.
It is my thesis, as outlined, that Weber's very campaign for value-free science was motivated by university politics. It is now possible to determine, at least preliminarily, the implications of this statement. It should be emphasized that Weber does not refer back to a then current norm for how academic activities should be conducted. Both at the congress in Jena and in the debate that subsequently followed in the German daily press, many had argued that university instructors should be allowed to teach, in principle, whatever they liked, not unaware, however, that in reality, such liberality required certain precautionary measures. As I have previously pointed out, it was the very fact that there were no clear restrictions on what could be taught at the universities that resulted in many feeling that it was all the more important that there be rules for who was allowed to teach there. In practice, therefore, uninhibited academic freedom seemed only to be possible under the condition that it be reserved for people who were sympathetic to the government. With a superb gesture, Weber now turns this argument upside down. The rules that he spells out for academic activities completely exclude the commonly accepted right to conduct what he himself calls Gesinnungsunterricht. In this particular sense, it is reasonable to say that he recommends a limitation of academic freedom. Weber is no more willing than anyone else to provide revolutionary critics of the regime with the opportunity to preach from the podium-on the contrary, he requires that all members of the academic community refrain from that right. If one accepts these restrictions on what can be taught at the universities, then there no longer seems to be any political incentive to regulate who should be allowed to teach. Arguments against letting Social Democrats conduct academic activities at once seem to be less well founded. In other words, Weber substitutes for the hypothetical unlimited academic freedom of his opponents, which was restricted in terms of the persons to whom it applied, an appropriately limited academic freedom, unrestricted in terms of persons.
It seems obvious that, for Weber, there was yet another reason to plead for value-free science in this context. As I have previously mentioned, he feared that the definition of Lehrfreiheit given at Jena could be used as a cover for a faculty-wide political standardization. Once again, it should be noted that the congress participants had expressed support for a principle that involved giving university teachers almost limitless freedom of expression from the podium. The chairman of the event, Karl von Amira, had specifically demanded that even teachings that were hostile to the state be tolerated in the lecture halls. It is apparent that Weber was not against this generosity only because it indirectly motivated discrimination, but also because it allowed academics to support the state in its ambition to turn students into loyal subjects. This is precisely what he was arguing when he issued the resolution in Jena against using freedom as a cover for ideological standardization. It is easy to see how the freedom to preach politics from the podium could be utilized by the state to indoctrinate future leading public officials. The rules that Weber spells out for academic education are in this respect designed to serve the interests of the students as well. One could even say that he poses the students' Lernfreiheit against the mostly orthodox professors' Lehrfreiheit.
The fact that the view of science espoused by Weber, even in a more formal regard, rests on certain normative assumptions, is apparent from the introduction to 'Der Sinn der "Wertfreiheit" '. That value-free science is desirable is in itself a value judgement and can therefore neither be verified nor falsified using scientific methods, he acknowledges (Weber 1988: 489-91) . But even those who insist on the fact-value gap are not forced to conclude that political and moral world-views are beyond the scope of university research and teaching. It is entirely possible to believe that value judgements lack scientific status and still believe that it should be the responsibility of a teacher to equip students with political norms and directions for how to act. It hardly needs pointing out that Weber, for his part, would find such a conclusion reprehensible. Even worse, in his view, is when a teacher ascribes his own personal political convictions with scientific credibility and uses the opportunity to foist them off onto their students. It follows from Weber's premises that anyone who attempts to represent a scientifically guaranteed worldview is either deceiving themselves or the people they are trying to convince. That is why it is not a coincidence that in the quote above, he considers it presumptuous (anmasslicher Unfug) for a university teacher to claim that he is able to prove the truth of certain political claims. The presumptuousness consists in the instructor, under the guise of scientific objectivity, taking the opportunity to impute upon other opinions that are, ultimately, only personal.
Unquestionably, it is an audacious agenda that Weber is promoting. Not only does he want to give enemies of the state the right to teach those young people who will, in the future, serve in the nation's leading positions. But he also demands that his colleagues muzzle themselves in certain respects. The question this raises is why academics would in general feel forced to accept the restrictions he proposes? Why should podium politicians, appointed by the government, willingly give up the right to vent their worldviews?
Towards the end of his article, Weber himself anticipates these objections. He has previously acknowledged that the indoctrination that the students receive at the nation's seats of learning, is due to the fact that their teachers receive their salaries from the government and that they generally feel obligated to educate loyal public workers and subjects. With the help of examples, he now mounts the powerful counter argument that a consistent application of this principle of unholy exchange would result in a whole host of rival world views winning academic legitimacy. The father who has to pay out of his own pocket for his son's education could then, with the same rights as the state, demand that the university have instructors employed to serve his political interests.
Resource-strong lobbying organizations, such as the workers unions and the federation of employers would surely also want to reserve professorships for their candidates. In the long run, emphasizes Weber, this will result in complete ideological fragmentation. 'Religious, economic, social and political parties would then all possess the right to have separate universities and professorships provided for them, in which instruction in accordance with their own ideals would be given.' According to Weber there is only one way to prevent this scenario from becoming a reality:
Cultural consensus in the field of education can be justified basically only on the condition of severe self-restraint in the observance of the canons of science and scholarship. If one desires this consensus, one must put aside the idea of any sort of instruction in ultimate values and beliefs; similarly the university teacher, especially in the confidentiality of his lecture hallnowadays of such solicitude-is under the sternest obligation to avoid proposing his own position in the struggle of ideals. He must make his chair into a forum where the understanding of ultimate standpoints-alien to and divergent from his own-is fostered, rather than into an arena where he propagates his own ideals (Weber 1908d: 91) .
It is a very high price that Weber fears that university instructors will have to pay if they continue to preach politics in their lecture halls. The doctrine of value-free science is in this context obviously intended to fortify the university system's inner unit. If everyone is to be given access to the universities, without them being ripped to shreds by internal conflicts among different interest groups, then academic instructors must avoid speaking out on political and moral issues. Otherwise, the academic world will be transformed into a veritable archipelago of ideologically rivalling institutions of learning.
What Weber attempts to demonstrate is that his opponents are acting against their own interests when they demand the right to express their own political opinions from the podium. The implicit assumption is, of course, that the other side really wants to preserve the unity that, by tradition, has characterized university life. Once again, criticism seems to have been primarily directed at the academics who attended the Congress in Jena. It is important to be aware why the resolution that the congress eventually approved was initially put forward. Prior to the event, it was reported in the Münchener Neusten Nachrichten that the catholic Center Party had recently succeeded in convincing the federal government in Bavaria to revoke the professorship of a theology teacher in Munich; a similar incident had allegedly occurred in Innsbruck. These examples warned of dangers to come. Since the Center Party's strategy had proved successful, there was an obvious risk that other parties would subsequently demand to be involved in deciding which candidates could be considered for academic positions: 'The rights that are currently extended to the religious political party will soon be extended to political, social and economic interest groups' (Amira 1908: 74) . When chairman Karl von Amira later spoke to colleagues assembled in Jena, he predicted that such a policy would ultimately be catastrophic: 'Exchanges between different seats of learning would cease… One would be forced to establish Protestant, Catholic, Jewish and who knows what kind of universities, all for the purpose of forcing a particular ideology on people' (BdMNN 1908b: 630) . In other words, Karl von Amira, in order to enlist support for his resolution on academic freedom, had referenced exactly the same threat that Weber describes in his article. The purpose of the resolution was to reinforce those particular principles without which the internal unity of the university world would be lost. The fact that the participants had nevertheless reserved for themselves the right to propagate their political opinions must, for Weber, have seemed fatefully inconsistent.
